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INTRODUCTION

Intellectual property, including copyright, is similar to other
types of property in the sense that it exists only insofar as the law
recognizes it and provides mechanisms for its protection. Copyright protection law differs from other property regimes in a number of respects. One attribute of this difference that has received
insufficient attention is the problem of providing protection for
bona fide purchasers of copyrighted material.
In real property law, the earliest decisions employed a simplistic principle: "first in time is first in right." The first purchaser of a
property interest prevailed against any subsequent purchaser.1 In
many instances, this rule provided the most appropriate resolution
of a conflict between two innocent purchasers2 who have been victimized by one unscrupulous seller. In such a situation, one pur* Howard University (B.M.E. 1967), Howard University (M.M.E. 1974), Seton Hall
Law School (J.D. 1977), Assistant Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I
would like to thank my research assistants, Tommie Ann Gibney, Maria Perez, and Paul
Tandoh. I also wish to thank my colleagues for their encouragement, criticism, and support.
1. The recording acts aside, priority between deeds, mortgages, judgments, and other
liens or titles is determined by the order in point of time in which they become effective. 2
W. WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 487, 488 (1947); 6A R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY

269 (1987).

This common law, non-statutory rule of priorities has been criticized.
There is logic in the "first in time, first in right" scheme of priority, but it is
logic of theory, not of practice. In this complex society, purchasers have no way
of checking on the status of the title unless they can rely on some official record
which shows all of the transactions in regard to the [property] in question.
J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 279 (1979).
2.
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chaser takes the property, and the others are relegated to bringing
suit for damages or restitution.'
In other situations, the "first in time" principle is unsatisfactory because it fails to recognize that the conduct of either the
original purchaser or the true owner may contribute to the fraud
upon the subsequent buyer." For example, a subsequent purchaser
may buy property in good faith from the "true" owner without any
knowledge of the prior sale, with the first purchaser facilitating the
second sale in some manner, perhaps by failing to take open pos6
session of the property.
The solution to most problems involving real estate lies in the
state's recording system. While such systems vary considerably in
some respects, a characteristic common to each is the protection of
persons who purchase real property from the owner "of record." If
a person appears to be the owner of the real property in question
based upon an examination of the documents filed in the recording
office, a buyer from this "record owner" will take good title to that
property.6 That the "record owner" may not be the same as the
"true owner" is irrelevant.7 The true owner may have various
causes of action for damages against the record owner,8 but the
subsequent purchaser's rights to the specific property are superior
3. Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N.C. 550, 5 S.E.2d 849 (1939). This statement is qualified
by the recognition of factual circumstances which dictate that the loser in a situation of this
type may take nothing, since the unscrupulous seller may be judgment-proof or in absentia.
Further qualification is necessitated by the situation where both the true owner and the
bona fide purchaser are equally diligent in protecting themselves against theft or acquisition
of a defective title. In this difficult situation, the courts attempt to mete out justice by
balancing the equities on a case-by-case basis.
4. In Heath v. Stoddard, 91 Me. 499, 40 A. 547 (1898), a true owner could not reclaim
a piano from a bona fide purchaser principally because the true owner entrusted the piano
to an agent who also sold musical instruments. The court posited that the true owner stood
by and permitted the fraud to occur, and was thereby estopped from asserting ownership.
See also Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953). The Heath
rule was codified in section 2-403(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, infra note 102.
5. Several courts have held that occupation consistent with a recorded title permits a
purchaser to attribute this possession to the seller and rely upon such title. See generally In
re Engelbrecht, 10 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Iowa 1935); Schell v. Kneedler, 359 Pa. 424, 59 A.2d
91 (1948); Olson v. Olson, 203 Minn. 99, 280 N.W. 640 (1938); 6A R. POWELL, supra note 1,
291-92.
6. 2 W. WALSH, supra note 1, at 488. The plain meaning and import of the system of
recording is that the purchaser has a right to rely upon the documents of record, Earle v.
Fiske, 103 Mass. 491 (1870), because the statute is intended to render titles secure and
prevent confusion, Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N.C. 550, 5 S.E.2d 849 (1939), and to provide
constructive notice to all who are bound to search the record, Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Kelton, 79 Ariz. 126, 285 P.2d 168 (1955).
7. 2 W. WALSH, supra note 1, at 3.
8. These may include actions for breach of contract, fraud, or injunctive relief.
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even to the rights of the true owner.
The recording scheme for real property is, of course, much
more complicated than this sketch indicates. For example, the
technical requirements of recordation frequently are determinative. Further, not every subsequent buyer takes free of the rights
of the true owner: He must be a bona fide purchaser, that is, one
who purchases the property for value, and without knowledge (or
notice) that the seller's power to transfer title is somehow
defective.'
Notwithstanding these special cases, the real property regime
generally creates a system by which persons who search the appropriate recording office can be relatively certain that they will get
what they think they are buying: a title to real property reasonably
free from doubt. There are analogous schemes with respect to personal property, and even with regard to certain intangible rights:
the Uniform Commercial Code has developed an elaborate scheme
for the protection of "security interests" in collateral which protects lenders from discovering too late that they have lent money
on the basis of property that has been previously sold (or pledged)
to another. ' ° Under the UCC, bona fide purchasers also have rights
which may be superior to those of the first person to deal with the
seller.
The common policy underlying these legal mechanisms for recording the indicia of ownership is to facilitate the marketability of
the property in question because the ability to freely transfer property rights in response to changing market conditions is one of the
most important ingredients in the successful operation of a free
market economy. As the nature of the American economy shifts
inexorably away from the traditional manufacture of goods towards the provision of services, the implementation of this policy
in areas involving intellectual property such as literary works, computer programs, educational and training materials, and entertainment emerges as a paramount concern. Indeed, a superficial reading of the Copyright Act of 1976 leads one to believe that such an
9. As long as the government remains stable, the risks are sufficiently minimal to induce insurance companies to issue policies covering losses suffered if the recording system
betrays their insured purchaser. In order to be accorded the protection of the judicial system, a bona fide purchaser must have purchased for value and without notice of the prior
conveyance after relying on the record. Walters v. Calderon, 25 Cal. App. 3d 863, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
10. U.C.C. Article Nine. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE Ch. 23 (1980) which outlines the priority scheme for perfected creditors under Article
Nine.
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adaptation has been achieved in this crucial area."
It is the thesis of this article that inadequate protection exists
under the Copyright Act of 1976 as presently written. If a meaningful system of protection for the bona fide purchaser of a copyright is to be created, it must come about by Congressional action
or by placing a strained judicial construction on a statute whose
approach to the question of bona fide purchaser rights is fundamentally flawed. Part I reviews the requirements for the recognition of federal copyright, and the significance attached to such protection: the ability of the owner of a copyright to sue anyone who
infringes his statutory rights. Part II discusses specific procedural
prerequisites for a copyright infringement suit and outlines the
federal registration and recording scheme. Part III draws upon the
previous analysis to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the copyright laws in dealing with the question of protecting the rights of a
bona fide purchaser.
II.

SUBSTANTIVE

REQUIREMENTS FOR COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP

Copyright law creates property interests by providing legal
recognition for interests which are otherwise merely moral rights.1"
Necessary components of a property interest are the legal recognition of ownership13 and the regulation of the incidents of ownership including (of paramount importance in a free market econ11. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Specifically, sections 201-205 (Copyright Ownership and Transfer) and sections 401-412 (Copyright
Notice, Deposit, and Registration) are analogous to those mechanisms which provide for the
recording of the indicia of ownership of real and personal property.
12. In its broadest application, moral rights refers to the underlying ethical consideration in awarding a creator any benefits derived by virtue of his creation. In this context, it
differs from the specific "droit morale" statutes in New York, California and New Jersey

which address the rights of a visual artist to be protected from defacement, mutilation, and
destruction of a work of fine art. See Clough, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of
Visual Artists: A Growing Trend in State Legislation 33 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM (1987).
13. In his famous concurring opinion in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), Justice Holmes characterized incidents of copyright property as
follows:
The notion of property starts, I suppose, from confirmed possession of a tangible
object and consists in the right to exclude others from interference with the
more or less free doing with it as one wills. But in copyright property has
reached a more abstract expression. The right to exclude is not directed to an
object in possession or owned, but is now in vacuo, so to speak. It restrains the
spontaneity of men where but for it there would be nothing of any kind to hin-

der their doing as they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the
persons or tangibles of the party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand miles from the owner and without his ever becoming aware of the wrong.
White-Smith Music Publishing Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19.
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omy) alienability. The Copyright Act of 1976, the most recent
manifestation of federal copyright law, defines the existence and
extent of the property created.1 ' However, the Copyright Act of
1976 relegates several significant ownership issues to state law, so
that copyright ownership contains mixtures of federal and state
law. Part A will outline the creation of the copyright property interest. Part B then will then consider the incidents of ownership of
the property right created.
A.

The Creation of a Copyright as Property

The Copyright Act of 1976 changed the law that had existed
since 1791 by establishing a single system of federal copyright protection. 15 Under prior copyright statutes, state and federal mechanisms of copyright protection co-existed,1 6 albeit neither peacefully
nor mutually. State common law protection was available for "unpublished" works while federal copyright protection covered published works. 17 The 1976 Act extended federal copyright protection
to all matter which is copyrightable, 5 regardless of whether it has
been "published." The statute explicitly preempts state law.1 9 If
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l)-(7) (1982) states, in pertinent part: "[Clopyright protection
subsists . . . in original works of authorship . . . includ[ing] the following categories: literary works; musical works, including any accompanying words; dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and sound recordings."
15. The single system of protection exists for all original works of authorship published or unpublished from the moment they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
State law is expressly preempted. A. LATMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 10 (2d ed. 1948).
16.
Until the advent of the Copyright Act of 1976, the American law of copyright
had been the subject of a dichotomy between federal and state law. Unpublished
works were automatically protected by state law, referred to somewhat inaccurately as common law copyright. Such protection began at the moment of creation, and terminated upon publication, when common law copyright was lost.
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02 (1987).
17. Considerable dispute arose over the concept of "publication" demarcating the
boundary between the two regimes. See generally Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950); Rosette v.
Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 546 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1976); King v. Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.
1960), vacated, 369 U.S. 111 (1962), on remand, 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967); National
Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15 (2d Cir. 1906), aff'd, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
18. A remnant of state protection may exist for expressions that do not meet the minimal standards for federal copyright. The Copyright Act of 1976 arguably permits states to
protect original works before they are "fixed." H. HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER 39 n.9 (1979).
19. Section 301 states:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
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the work is not copyrightable under federal law, there is no statutorily protectable property interest.2 0
The basic requirement for federal protection derives from the
statute's statement that "[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in
original work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."'" The two elements of copyright are thus originality and
fixation.
Originality in copyright, unlike the Patent Act's requirement
of "novelty, '2 2 does not entail newness, creativity, or striking uniqueness.2 3 Rather, it suffices that the work was "original" to the
author, 2that
is, that the particular work "owed its origin to the
author." 4 The standard is virtually de minimis:15 iteffectively excludes only works that are either already copyrighted 2 6 or in the
Section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by Sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under
the common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
20. This conclusion assumes that there is no protectable interest under other federal
statutes related to intellectual property, such as patent and trademark law. See also supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
22. The novelty requirements of the 1952 Patent Act are set forth at sections 101, 102,
and 103 of Title 35 of the United States Code. There are three conditions necessary for
granting a patent: novelty, utility (§§ 101, 102); and non-obviousness (§ 103). Section 103
further sets forth conditions for patentability as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter sought as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
23. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Runge v.
Lee, 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887 (1971).
24. Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 102; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936),
aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
25. L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
26. Indeed, on a theoretical level, copyright protection can reach work already copyrighted or in the public domain so long as the work was independently originated. However,
the protection offered in such cases would be of no use: everyone would be free to copy a
public domain work, though prohibited from copying the independently created version.
Frequently cited for this proposition is Judge Learned Hand's phrase in Sheldon: "[I]f
by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats' Ode On a
Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author', and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that
poem, though they might of course copy Keats." Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.
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public domain. Indeed, even materials in the public domain or
previously copyrighted works can provide the basis for newly copyrighted works if the requisite minimal originality is satisfied in the
creation of the new versions.2 ' For example, a new edition of
Shakespeare's works could be copyrightable in order to protect a
new treatment and artwork, although the words of the Bard have
been in the public domain for centuries.
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, fixation of an original work
may be accomplished in any variety of several media, in recognition of the rapidly evolving technology. For example, under the old
copyright statutes, music and dance were incapable of being
"fixed" except by written notation.2 9 But under the new Act, fixation can occur by recording the musical sounds on tape or by visually recording the choreography. Fixation of a computer program
may be on disk or even in the computer's volatile memory cells.
In short, any original creation fixed in any perceptible medium
is protected. As the quantum of originality for copyright is very
low, the protection given is correspondingly limited because the
statute does not protect the idea or concept of the work 31 but only
the author's expression of it.2 This idea/expression dichotomy has
given rise to a significant amount of litigation.13 Nevertheless, the
27. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 121 (1980); 17 U.S.C. § 8: "No copyright shall subsist in the original text of any
work which is in the public domain ...."
28. Sheldon, 81 F.2d 49; Golding v. R.K.O., 221 P.2d 95 (1950); Fisher v. Dillingham,
298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090
(2d Cir. 1977).
29. Music was notated in the form of sheet music or lead sheets, while dance notation
was entitled "Labanotation" or "Benesh Notation." Traylor, Choreography, Pantomime
and the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 16 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 227, 231 (1981).
30. Section 102(a) of the Act recognizes fixation "in any manner now known or later
developed" from which the work "can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
31. Section 102(b) states: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea . . . [or] concept, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
32. If the proverbial band of monkeys playing with typewriters were to create "Hamlet" without reference to Shakespeare, theoretically they would be able to copyright their
work. Of course, while no one could copy their creation, everyone would be able to copy
Shakespeare's work, which is in the public domain. See supra note 26.
33. As to historical facts, see Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp.
40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). As to
plot and literary characters, see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930). As to fictional characters, see Detective Comics, Inc., v. Bruns Publishing, Inc., 111
F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) where the court declared, "We think it plain that the defendants
have used more than general types and ideas and have appropriated the pictorial and liter-
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distinction is critical to the whole scheme of copyright protection
and distinguishes that statute from the Patent Act. 4
Once an author has fixed his or her original work in a tangible
medium of expression, the Copyright Act is supposed to protect
the author against infringement. 5 Infringement is defined as certain designated uses inconsistent with the copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce; to prepare derivative works; to distribute
copies; to publicly perform the work; and to display the work.3
The tenor of this scheme, as opposed to the former law, is to
provide federal protection even before "publication" has occurred:
after all, publication is included in the rights to reproduce and distribute, in the case of written works, and to perform or display
music and dance. While there is no requirement of publication for
protection, if the copyright owner does publish, he or she must include a copyright notice3 , or risk loss of the copyright. However
the Copyright Act of 1976 liberalizes prior law by permitting an
owner who publishes without the appropriate notice to cure that
defect within five years, subject to certain limitations.3
Moreover, copyright protection exists in principle before registration of the work with the Copyright Office. Section 408, which
establishes the requirements for registration, explicitly provides
that "registration is not a condition of copyright protection. 3 9 The
work is protected the moment it is created -even before the work
is completed.4 0 However, the practical value of this protection is
ary details embodied in the copyrights." Id. at 433; Sid and Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). As to bookkeeping systems and forms, see
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) wherein the court stated: "When the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting
the expression in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law." Id. at 103.
See also Morrissey v. Proctor and Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); Continental
Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958); Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944).
34. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
35. Section 501(a) defines infringer as follows: "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by Sections 106 through 118, or who imports
copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of Section 602, is an infringer of
the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
36. Id. § 106.
37. Id. § 401.
38. Id. § 405(a)(2).
39. Section 408 qualifies this statement by making it "subject to section 405(a)." 17
U.S.C. § 408(a) (1982). Section 405 deals with the copyright notice which is to be placed on
works "publicly distributed by authority of the copyright owner." If the notice is omitted,
the copyright is invalid, subject to several relatively narrow exceptions. Id. § 405(a).
40. The statute provides that a work is "created" when it is fixed for the first time. As
to works prepared over a period of time "the portion of it that has been fixed at any partic-
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sharply circumscribed by the provisions addressing the remedies
for infringement."1 The Act provides that a plaintiff may not seek
to enjoin an infringement until he has registered.,2 The legislative
history of the Copyright Act addresses this question directly:
"Under the bill, as under the law now in effect, a copyright owner
who has not registered his claim can have a valid cause of action
against someone who has infringed his copyright, but he cannot
enforce his rights in the courts until he has made registration.'43
Despite this precondition to enforcement, it remains meaningful to describe copyright protection as being independent of registration: such protection comes into being prior to registration in
the sense that a person who infringes one of the five exclusive
rights is liable for acts committed before registration.""
B.

Ownership Of Copyright

The creation of a "property" interest necessarily recognizes
ownership of that interest. The parallel principles in the law of real
property also address the question of the right of an owner to
transfer all or part of the property created." The 1976 Copyright
Act addresses this question in a tortuous manner.
Section 102, which deals with the "subject matter of copyright," speaks in the passive voice: "copyright protection subsists"
in original works which are fixed as required. But in whom does
the protection subsist? The first statutory recognition of this question appears in section 106 which specifies that the five exclusive
rights comprising the copyright belong to the "owner." The term
"copyright owner" is defined in section 101, most unhelpfully, as
follows: "'Copyright owner,' with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that
'46
particular right.
More assistance is found in Chapter Two of the Act, comular time constitutes the work as of that time ...." Id. § 101.
41. See infra notes 45-71 and accompanying text.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1982).
43. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-62 (1976) p. 157 [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT].

44. The specific language of the House Report states in pertinent part: "Under the
general scheme of the bill, a copyright owner whose work has been infringed before registration would be entitled to the remedies ordinarily available in infringement cases ...." Id. at
158.
45. The law of property involves six rights: the right to possess, exclude others, dispose, use, enjoy the fruits and profits, and destroy. Pound, The Law of Property and Recent
Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 991, 996 (1939).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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mencing at section 201, which defines the "Initial Owner" of a
copyright as "the author or authors of the work."4 Unfortunately,
the statute does not define "author," but case law fills that omission. 8 The question of authorship of a work typically is not difficult. The author is normally the creator. But the Copyright Act
recognizes two qualifications to that statement. The first is the
question of joint authorship, where more than one author contributes to a copyrightable work. This recognition is reflected in the
Act in the concept of "joint work." A joint work is one which is the
product of two or more persons who intend at the time of creation
that their contributions be an inseparable part of a unitary
whole.' 9 This is distinguishable from a work which includes intentionally separable contributions. For example, two persons might
collaborate on a musical work, one being the author of the lyrics,
the other the author of the music. If the two intended the final
product to be one work of authorship, a joint work is created and
the two authors are indivisible owners of a unitary whole. If, however, the two viewed their contributions as separate, each has individual authorship rights and exclusive rights to his or her contribution. Each may register separately.
A second qualification of author is found in the "works for
hire" doctrine. A work for hire may exist in two contexts, but in
either case, the creator's employer, and not the actual creator, is
considered the "author." 5 The first situation occurs when the
work is "prepared by the employee within the scope of his or her
employment. '5 1 The second situation covers works which are "specially ordered or commissioned" and include a number of listed
uses. 52 The first category seems to include the "employment" rela47. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
48. The person who claims authorship of the copyright in the first instance must be
the "author" or his successor in interest. Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975); Van Cleef & Arpels, Inc. v. Schechter, 308 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
50. The Copyright Act develops a number of provisions related to the rights of the
employer-author. In determining nationality for registration purposes, see 17 U.S.C. §§
104(b)(1), (4); M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 16, at § 5.05[B]; with respect to the
manufacturing clause, see § 601(b)(1), HoUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 167; as to duration,
17 U.S.C. §§ 302(c), 304(a); with respect to termination, see 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
52. Subsection (2) of section 101 defines "work made for hire" to include:
a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as
a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a writ-
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tionship, while the second category embraces what would otherwise
be known as "independent contractors."
Once authorship is determined, that person is the "initial
owner" who is vested with the five exclusive rights comprising the
copyright. The concept of initial owner necessarily suggests subsequent owners and therefore, the possibility of transfers of ownership. Section 201(d) addresses various kinds of transfers, and
makes two important distinctions. First, the statute recognizes that
the "copyright" property, like other property, is really the sum total of a "bundle of rights" or interests which can be transferred
together or separately. Each of the five exclusive rights comprising
the copyright can be transferred independently of the others; but
more importantly, each of the exclusive rights also can be subdivided and these subdivisions can be transferred. 3 Under the 1909
Act, a copyright was considered indivisible, virtually incapable of
transfer in part."' There was little or no recognition of a copyright
owner's ability to carve out portions of the copyright interest and
transfer less than the entire interest.55 Hence, the old Act adopted
the traditional property distinction between assignments and licenses, granting standing to sue only to those who held the copyright interest by assignment.5 Several theories were advanced for
this proposition. The first justification was the necessity of protectten instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a
work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising,
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords,
afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical
arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes,
and an "instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for
publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.
Id.
53. This is clear from section 201(d)(2) of the Act, which states:
Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision
of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by
clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is
entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1982).
54. See generally Kaminstein, Divisibility of Copyright, 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 623
(1963).
55. But see Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970) (Indivisibility principle not determinative regarding ability of party to seek copyright).
56. See generally International Film Exchange, Ltd. v. Corinth Films, Inc., 621 F.
Supp. 631, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275 F. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 279 F. 747 (2d
Cir. 1922).
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ing alleged infringers from the harassment of successive lawsuits."
The second simply incorporated the notion that, under the old Act,
the only effective manner in which a copyright could be exploited
was through the reproduction of copies.5 a However, "advancing
technological and creative uses dictated the creation of a system
recognizing the lucrative potential of exploiting various creative
'59
sub-species or interests in a single work.
To illustrate the point, suppose an author writes a manuscript.
She has the right to reproduce it in hardback book form. That
right could be assigned to a publisher. The author, however, might
wish to retain the movie rights or the right to dramatize the work
as a theatrical production. Therefore, it is possible that the author
will later assign the motion picture rights to a studio, and the dramatic rights to a Broadway producer. At this point, there are at
least three separate persons who have ownership interests in the
work, none of whom is the author. But the author may have retained still other rights, such as television rights or the right to
publish the book in paperback form. While some of these rights
(such as the right to reproduce the work) constitute one of the five
basic rights, others (such as motion picture and dramatic rights)
are subdivisions of one basic right (the right to make derivative
works). Further, it is possible for persons to be granted either exclusive or nonexclusive rights. For the moment, these distinctions
are not important, although we will return to the question later.
Second, the Copyright Act of 1976 makes clear that any of
these rights"0 may be transferred to a subsequent owner. Such interest may be transferred, according to section 201(d)(1) "by any
means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or passed as personal property by the applicable
laws of intestate succession.""
Similarly, in dealing with infringement suits, section 501(b)
provides that: "The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right
under a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 205(d) [recordation] and 411 [registration] to institute an ac57. See Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 401 (1949) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). See also New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). This
procedural safeguard was largely negated by subsequent rules permitting joinder between
the holder of the license and the copyright proprietor. M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note
16, at § 12.02.
58. M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 16, at § 10.01.
59. Id.
60. Section 210(d)(1) provides for transfer "in whole or in part."
61. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1982).
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tion for any infringement of that particular right committed while
he or she is the owner of it." 2
What emerges from this regime is an incorporation of state
law into the federal scheme. This is explicit in the reference to
"applicable law of intestate succession" in section 201(d)(1), but
seems implicit in the phrase "operation of law," presumably referring to state systems. s Similarly, the reference to "legal or beneficial owner" seems to contemplate a property regime far more elaborate than that found in the Copyright Act itself. 4
But is the incorporation of state laws more complete? Does
state law define how and in what manner the copyright may be
transferred? The answer is not so clear. The Copyright Act of 1976
explicitly legislates the formal requirements of a transfer: "A
transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is
not valid unless an instrument of conveyance or a note or memorandum of the transfer is in writing and signed by the owner of the
rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent.""5
This section establishes a kind of statute of frauds precluding
the effectiveness of any purported transfer which does not meet
the stated conditions. Does this statute leave other questions of
the effectiveness of transfers to state law?
Perhaps this can be clarified by an example. An author writes
a manuscript, and therefore creates a property interest which is
expressed by saying that it is "copyrighted." As author, he is the
initial owner. He can transfer the copyright according to the federal statute, so long as the transfer is accomplished in an appropriate manner. But suppose the writer executes a writing purporting
62. Id. § 501(b).
63. Section 301(b) specifically refers to the power of the state to exercise jurisdiction
with respect to:
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in
any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106.
Id. § 301(b).
64. The courts apply the concept of beneficial owner in those circumstances where, for
example, an author assigns his copyright interest to a publisher who contractually accepts
the responsibility of preserving the copyright in the literary work. If the publisher allows the
work to enter the public domain through commission or omission, the publisher is regarded
as holding the copyright in trust for the author. Thus, although the publisher may hold the
"legal" interest in the copyright, the author is said to hold the "beneficial" interest.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
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to transfer the copyright to his daughter. Is this transfer effective?
Under traditional state law, the question would be whether the
transfer was pursuant to a contract with valid consideration or
whether it was an effective gift, requiring both delivery (presumably, of the transfer instrument)"6 and donative intent.
To focus the question even more, suppose the author is a 14
year-old who, by written instrument, purports to transfer the copyright to a buyer. Is this transfer from a minor effective? The answer to this question appears to be a matter of state law. If so,
then the federal Copyright Act establishes the minimum requirement of a valid transfer - a sufficient writing67 - but leaves other
questions of transferability to state law. 8
While this interpretation of the Act is not inevitable, 9 it
seems the better reading because the particular section recognizing
transferability expressly states that state law is controlling with regard to intestate transfers and defers to state law with respect to
transfers by "operation of law.""0
66. This presumption has its basis in the notion that transfer of the copyright is not
presumed by change of possession of the manuscript, since the Act mandates the distinction
between ownership of the copyright and ownership of the material object. Section 202 states
in pertinent part:
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord
in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement does
transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright
convey property rights in any material object.
Id. § 202.
67. Federal law may also alter what state law might otherwise require in different

ways. For example, section 202 provides that:
Ownership of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object ... does not of itself convey any
rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the work; nor, in the absence of an
agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or any exclusive rights
under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.
Id. § 202.
68. Section 101, the definitions section of the Act, elaborates on this somewhat: A
"transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license or any other
conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights
comprised in the copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not
including a nonexclusive license. Id. § 101.
69. Congress could have intended to have all questions of transferability decided by
federal law. To the extent that they were not explicitly addressed in the statute, the federal
courts would be charged with creating a federal common law of copyright.
70. The term "operation of law" covers a multitude of situations. One obvious example might be transfers under federal bankruptcy law, which normally do not implicate state
law. But the phrase generally also includes transfers accomplished by traditional state law
means, including trusts and estates law, transfers by matrimonial courts, transfers in the
dissolution of corporations and partnerships, and transfers to satisfy judgments for money
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In sum, federal law defines the property, specifies its initial
owner, and establishes the separate rights which may be transferred. It also establishes minimum requirements for transfer. But
federal law then defers to state law in determining the substantive
law of alienation of property. 1

III.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR VINDICATING COPYRIGHTS

The fact that a person owns a copyright is not sufficient, in
and of itself, to allow her to sue for its infringement. The Copyright Act of 1976 establishes two procedural prerequisites to suit:
registration and recordation. First, the statute requires "registration" as a condition precedent to suit for infringement.7"Section
411 of the statute provides in pertinent part: "[n]o action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance
with this title ...
This might suggest that copyright protection
does not exist until registration, but, as we have seen, another provision of the Act expressly provides that "registration is not a condamages.
Of course, a problem arises as to whether a state court can adjudicate the ownership or
the validity of a copyright. The answer appears to be in the affirmative, although it is also
clear that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of "infringement" actions. See generally T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915
(1965); Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Aldon
Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
71. There may be a serious question as to whether state law can treat copyrights differently than other property, or whether federal law presumes that state law will treat copyright transfers as it does transfers of comparable property.
72. The statute has several exceptions to the registration requirement. Most obviously,
section 411 provides that a plaintiff who attempts to register but is refused registration by
the Copyright Office may sue for infringement, provided that notice and the complaint are
served on the Office. Section 411 also creates an exception in paragraph (b) for a work which
is fixed simultaneously with its transmission as follows:
(b) In the case of a work consisting of sounds, images, or both, the first fixation
of which is made simultaneously with its transmission, the copyright owner may,
either before or after such fixation takes place, institute an action for infringement under section 501, fully subject to the remedies provided by sections 502
through 506 and sections 509 and 510, if, in accordance with requirements that
the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, the copyright owner (1) serves notice upon the infringer, not less than ten or more than thirty
days before such fixation, identifying the work and the specific time and source
of its first transmission, and declaring an intention to secure copyright in the
work; and
(2) makes registration for the work within three months after its first
transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 411 (1982).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1982).
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dition of copyright protection."7 Thus, it is clear that Congress
intended to create substantive rights which are subject to procedural requirements before they can be enforced.7 5
The simple paradigm of this system in operation occurs when
the author of the work also registers it. In order to sue successfully
for infringement, a plaintiff not only must own the copyright at the
time of infringement, but also must be able to establish that the
copyright was registered. The registering author has no problems
satisfying these requirements. Section 408 of the Copyright Act
mandates that the "owner of a copyright or of any exclusive right
in the work" may register the work. The author may register because the statute provides that "the author or authors of the work"
are the "initial owners."7 6 In short, an infringement suit may be
brought by the initial owner if he or she has "registered" the work
with the Copyright Office, 77 so long as the author has not transferred the relevant interest to anyone else. Once registration occurs, the author-registrant may sue not only for infringements occurring after the registration but also for infringements which
occurred previously. 8 Unfortunately, this simple paradigm does
not exhaust all the possibilities. The problem becomes more difficult when the author transfers some or all of his interests to others.
The Copyright Act plainly envisions that there may be subsequent
owners - persons to whom the initial owner has transferred the
74. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1982).
75. There is another important distinction which turns on registration. The Copyright
Act of 1976 generally provides plaintiffs with either actual damages or "statutory damages,"
and, in both cases, attorneys' fees. 17 U.S.C §§ 504-505 (1982). But section 412 forecloses
both statutory damages and attorneys' fees for the period prior to registration:
In any action under this title, other than an action instituted under section
411(b), no award of statutory damages or of attorney's fees, as provided by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for...
(1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced
before the effective date of its registration; or
(2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the
work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is
made within three months after the first publication of the work.
17 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
76. The "initial owner" is also the "author" under the Copyright Act, that is, the person who created the work in question. The statute also makes clear that the owner of an
"exclusive right" also may register. 17 U.S.C. § 408. It has been argued, however, that a
person who owns some of the exclusive rights (but less than all of them) is not the owner of

the copyright. H.

HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER

(1979). Therefore, while the Copyright Act per-

mits such a person to register, he or she may do so only on behalf of the owner.
77. The formalities of registration require completion of application; deposit of copies
(§ 408(b)); and payment of fees (§ 409).
78. Infringement suits are subject to the statute of limitations of three years contained
in section 507.
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copyright. More accurately, the statute envisions the possibility of
a number of subsequent owners because the initial owner may
transfer any or all of the five exclusive rights which make up the
copyright. Unlike prior law,7 9 under the Copyright Act of 1976 the
original owner may transfer any or all of his exclusive rights to an
assignee. Further, the initial owner may transfer a part of any of
his exclusive rights to an assignee."0
To keep the analysis manageable, suppose that the initial
owner transfers the entire copyright. Such transfers will affect the
right to bring suit depending on whether the transfers are made
before or after registration.
A.

Transfer of Rights Prior to Registration

The initial owner may register her copyright, but suppose she
does not. Instead she transfers the copyright to another person. At
this point, there is another "owner" of the copyrighted work, but
only one "initial owner." Further, neither can sue for infringement
unless the copyright has been registered. Can anyone other the initial owner register the copyright or any exclusive right?
The statute appears to answer the question in the affirmative.
Section 408(a) provides: "At any time during the subsistence of
copyright in any published or unpublished work the owner of copyright or any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of
the copyright claim ... ."81 Since this language speaks of "owners,"
not merely "initial owners," subsequent owners who take the copyright from the author, presumably by transfer, are authorized to
register the copyright. The author of the work, who was the initial
owner, may no longer own any part of the copyright. So the present owner (of the entire copyright or of any exclusive right in the
copyright) can seek registration. This is confirmed by the provisions of section 409 which specify the requirements for an application for registration. Section 409(5) explicitly anticipates a "copyright claimant" who is not an "author": "[I1f the copyright
claimant is not the author [there shall be] a brief statement of how
the copyright claimant obtained ownership of the copyright."82
79. Kaminstein, supra note 54.
80. An "assignment" must be distinguished from a "license," and, indeed, it is important to distinguish between exclusive and non-exclusive licensees. An assignment transfers
all of the owner's interest in the right assigned, whereas a license transfers a specific portion
of the rights.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1982).
82. Id. § 409(5).
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Section 409(11) also permits the Register of Copyrights to require
more information on "ownership," among other questions. 3
One important question is whether a person other than an initial owner must provide the Copyright Office with written documentation of how he or she came to own the copyright or exclusive
right in question. The instructions contained in the application for
copyright registration require a statement of the manner in which
the rights were acquired, and specifically prohibit the attachment
of further documentation. 4
B.

Transfer of Rights After Registration

"Recordation" is the mechanism employed by the Copyright
Act to determine who, other than the registrant, may sue for infringement. Under the statute, anyone other than the copyright
registrant may bring an infringement suit only if such transfer is
by "operation of law" or if an instrument of transfer from the initial owner to the plaintiff seeking to enforce the transferred rights
is recorded in the Copyright Office. 85
Section 204(a) deals with the requirements of an effective
transfer. It provides: "A transfer of copyright ownership other than
by operation of law is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance
or a note or memorandum of the transfer is in writing and signed
by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent." ' 6 Section 205(d) goes further: "No person claiming by
virtue of a transfer to be the owner of copyright or any exclusive
83. Id. § 409(11).
84. The instructions read as follows:
Transfer: The statute provides that, if the copyright claimant is not the author,
the application for registration must contain "a brief statement of how the
claimant obtained ownership of the copyright." If any copyright claimant named
in space 4 is not an author named in space 2, give a brief, general statement
summarizing the means by which that claimant obtained ownership of the copyright ....
Do not attach transfer documents or other attachments or riders.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FORM TX, APPLICATION FOR COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR A NONDRAMATIC LITERARY WORK, reprinted in R. CHICKERING & S. HARTMAN, How To REGISTER A COPYRIGHT AND PROTECT YOUR CREATIVE WORK 38, 45 (1987).

Instructions similar to those in form TX also are found in forms VA, PA and SR which are,
respectively, the applications for copyright registration for a work of the visual arts, a work
of the performing arts, and a sound recording. Id. at 55, 65 and 75.
85. The only exceptions to the principle that only the initial owner or persons taking
from him or her by virtue of a recorded instrument transferring the initial owner's rights to
a transferee are copyrights that pass by operation of law. Thus, where the holder of a copyright dies, that right will pass either by will or intestacy. Similarly, when a copyright holder
enters bankruptcy, the copyright may be transferred through the processes of bankruptcy
court.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982).
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right under a copyright is entitled to institute an infringement action under this title until the instrument of transfer under which
such person claims has been recorded in the Copyright Office."8
As with registration, however, the statute provides that the recordation is not critical to the transfer of ownership; it is only a condition precedent to the right to sue to vindicate that ownership. Section 205(d) goes on to state: "Suit may be instituted after such
recordation on a cause of action which arose before recordation." 88
In short, then, an infringement suit will pose no questions about
the "standing" of the plaintiff to bring the action: if the plaintiff is
the person claiming copyright, he or she need only produce a certificate of registration naming him or her as owner to support the
suit. Registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright."' The registrant may be the author of the work or someone to whom ownership was transferred before the author registered the work. In the latter case, the registrant apparently is able
to commence an infringement action without satisfying the recordation requirements."0
If the plaintiff is someone other than the registrant, presumably, she will be able to produce both the certificate of registration
identifying the author and a certificate of recordation establishing
in herself the transfer of the right(s) being sued upon."
Thus, in the preceding hypothetical, the transferee receiving
the distribution rights may bring an infringement suit only after
showing both the author's registration and the recorded transfer.
This scheme seems designed to create a recording system to
minimize disputes about the ownership of the rights in question. It
also encourages registration and/or recordation so that subsequent
purchasers of such rights can, by examination of the records of the
Copyright Office, determine the identity of the record owner.
However, this statutory scheme creates a number of problems
which the courts have not resolved effectively. One question is
87. Id. at § 205(d).
88. Id.
89. Section 410(c) states: "In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration
made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima
facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate." 17
U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
90. The transferee must produce a document of transfer or proof of acquisition of the
copyright by operation of law.
91. To illustrate, the initial owner may have transferred the right in question directly
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff can thus point to both the registration and one recorded transfer. If the initial owner transferred to intervening assignees, then the plaintiff should be able
to show a proper chain of title by registration and as many recordations as necessary.
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whether the courts must insist on strict adherence to the registra-

tion and recordation requirements, as opposed to permitting the
defenses of waiver or estoppel. a2 A second, and more serious, prob92. A number of cases describe both recordation and registration as "jurisdictional
prerequisites" to suit. That phrase, if it is chosen deliberately, must mean that the courts
simply lack jurisdiction over suits unless and until the particular prerequisite has been
satisfied.
On the other hand, not everything which is a procedural prerequisite to suit is truly
"jurisdictional." For example, statutes of limitation typically bar suits unless they have been
commenced within a certain time of the accrual of the cause of action. Courts view such
statutes as not strictly prohibiting suit after the time has elapsed, that is, not jurisdictional
in the strict sense, but rather being subject to such modifications as waiver and tolling.
The question is whether copyright registration and recordation requirements are jurisdictional or subject to such modifications. The Supreme Court recently addressed a requirement in another federal statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) which had previously been characterized as a "jurisdictional prerequisite" by the Supreme Court itself and
treated as strictly controlling by a number of lower courts. The requirement that the plaintiff have filed a charge of discrimination with a federal agency within a certain time after
the violation as a condition precedent for bringing suit in court was held by the Supreme
Court not to be a true jurisdictional prerequisite, but, like statutes of limitations, subject to
equitable modifications like waiver and tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385
(1982).
A typical statute of limitations is phrased in a manner similar to the language regarding
registration and recordation. The registration statute, for example, provides that "no action
for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title." 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1982). This is
modeled on the typical statute of limitations which begins: "no action may be maintained
...
" Indeed, the Copyright Act of 1976 has its own statute of limitations which provides
that "No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued." Id. § 507(b). It is clear, however, that
this language has not been construed to bar judicial modifications. For example, courts have
permitted the tolling of the limitations period for a plaintiff to assert fraudulent concealment. Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 612 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1980).
On the other hand, there is language in § 411(a) itself which, by implication at least,
suggests that the Congress viewed the requirement of registration as jurisdictional. After
setting down the general rule that infringements actions cannot be commenced without a
registration, the statute goes on to create an exception: a proper attempt to register is all
that is required if the Register of Copyright refuses registration. In such cases, the Register
may, at its option, become a party. The paragraph concludes: "but the Register's failure to
become a party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine the issue lof infringement]." Id. § 411(a).
While this does not directly state that registration is a jurisdictional prerequisite, it at
least suggests that Congress was thinking in jurisdictional terms when it was prescribing
registration as a prerequisite to suit. In fact, the courts addressing this issue generally described registration as a jurisdictional requirement. See, e.g. Techniques, Inc. v. Rohn, 592
F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), citing Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches,
Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958); Frankel v. Stein and Day, Inc., 470 F.
Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980); G.P. Putnam's Sons v. Lancer
Books, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Algonquin Music v. Mills Music, Inc., 93 F.
Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
One question has been whether a suit commenced before the appropriate recordation
can continue to be prosecuted after the registration occurs. Under a strict jurisdictional
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lem concerns the extent to which the registration and recordation
scheme protects the rights of bona fide purchasers.
IV.

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS OF COPYRIGHTS

To understand the rights of a bona fide purchaser under the
Copyright Act, perhaps a hypothetical will assist the analysis. Imagine a simple fact situation. You have been approached by Smith
who wants to transfer to you all of his interest in a musical composition entitled "Green Eyes." Being a cautious person, you go down
to the Register of Copyrights and first examine the registration
records. Sure enough, just as Smith claimed, there is a registration
for "Green Eyes." Being very cautious, you proceed to the deposit
section and discover that the registered material is, in fact, precisely the work which Smith has attempted to sell you. Now, being
exceptionally cautious, you proceed to the recordation records and,
looking under Smith's name as Transferor (and under "Green
Eyes" by Title) you determine that no person has recorded any
document transferring any interest in the work.
Feeling confident, you return to Smith, pay him what he asks,
obtain an instrument of transfer and record that with the Register.
Having been so careful, you are surprised when, one month later,
in the midst of expensive preparations for the production of
"Green Eyes" on Broadway, Jones, a stranger, approaches you and
claims to own the work.
If we approach the question in terms of the statute, the first
analysis, the court must dismiss the suit because it has no jurisdiction to entertain it. Plaintiff may then refi]e it, but is subject to any intervening running of the statute of limitations.
Under the old Copyright Act, it was argued that the statute is not phrased in terms of
prohibiting the commencement of an action without registration but only in barring the
"maintaining" of such an action. Therefore, it is argued, a suit may be continued if the
registration is obtained prior to the court's decision on a motion to dismiss. This analysis
was roundly rejected by the courts under the prior act. See New York Times Co. v. Sun
Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 204 F. 586 (2d Cir. 1913); New York Times v. Star Co., 195 F.
110 (2d. Cir. 1912). It is obviously inapplicable under the Copyright Act of 1976 because the
present law bars the "institution" of suit without a predicate registration.
The same issue arises with respect to recordation. Perhaps because fewer persons attempt to bring infringement suits without a predicate registration than without recordation,
there are more cases dealing with this issue. The courts tend to state that recordation is a
"jurisdictional prerequisite to maintenance of a copyright infringement action," but they
have rarely analyzed the question in any depth. E.g., Nation's Choice Vitamin Co. v. General Mills, 526 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Co-Opportunities, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 510 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Ruskin v. Sunrise Management, Inc., 506 F. Supp.
1284 (D. Colo. 1981); Burns v. Rockwood Distributing Co., 481 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
In Co-Opportunities,the plaintiff sought and was granted leave to amend his complaint
in order to cure his defective registration.
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issue is how the stranger claims to own the work. If Jones states
that he is the transferee by conveyance from Smith, who is both
the registrant and the person claiming to be the author, you immediately feel secure. Even if Jones has an instrument of transfer
signed by Smith (which the Copyright Act of 1976 would require
for the transfer to be effective), the recordation provisions of the
Act make clear that you have the copyright not Jones: he failed to
record his transfer, and therefore you, as a bona fide purchaser,
prevail against him because of your subsequent recordation of the
transfer from Smith. Jones's only right is to sue Smith for breach
of contract or restitution. He cannot sue you for infringement, and
he cannot perform the work without infringing the copyright which
you own by virtue of your recordation.
This seems the clear purport of section 205(e):
As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first
prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one month after its
execution in the United States or within two months after its
execution outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later
transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if taken in
good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier
transfer."
The "first in time, first in right" principle is subordinated to the
recordation system: a subsequent purchaser, who meets the section's definition of taking for value and without notice of the earlier transfer prevails over the prior transferee who has not recorded. The prior transferee prevails only if he or she first records.
Obviously, the concepts of "good faith" taking, "valuable consideration," and "without notice" may raise questions, but presumably Congress intended for the courts to look for analogies to bona
fide purchaser law in other contexts."4 But other questions arise
which are peculiar to copyright law. The statute protects the transferee who is first in time within one month (or, if outside the
United States, two months) to record. Thus, if Jones recorded after
you did he would have rights superior to yours if his recordation
occurred within one month of its execution in the United States or
93. 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1982).
94. The provision makes clear that a transfer with a promise to pay royalties is one for
a valuable consideration. Thus, it is not necessary that any advance payment be made in
order to qualify the transfer as bona fide if the transferee promises the transferror royalties.
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within two months if executed outside this country. In terms of
planning, however, this poses no substantial problem for well-advised copyright transferees: obviously, the anticipated consideration should be held in escrow for two months after the transfer is
recorded. If a second search at the Register's Office reveals no intervening competing recordation, the buyer takes over prior transferees who fail to timely record. 5
The linchpin of this whole scheme, however, is an effective
recordation. Subdivision (e) expressly refers to subdivision (c) of
Section 205 as establishing effective constructive notice for the
purposes of recordation. Subdivision (c), in turn, provides:
Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document, but only if (1) the document, or material attached to it, specifically identifies the work to which it pertains so that, after the document is
indexed by the Register of Copyrights, it would be revealed by a
reasonable search under the title or registration number of the
work; and
(2) registration has been made for the work."
Reverting to our hypothetical, you will be protected against Jones
so long as your recordation refers either to the title "Green Eyes"
or the registration number assigned to Smith when he registered,
and Jones failed to record his transfer within two months of
execution.
In sum, bona fide purchasers who record their transfers seem
to be protected as against other transferees who have received
their claim to the copyright property based on consensual transfers
defined by section 101 to include: "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecations
of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect,
but not including a nonexclusive license."9 7
But a closer examination of the statute reveals large lapses in
the theoretical protection accorded the bona fide purchaser which
occur when ownership changes other than by transfer. The most
obvious situation occurs when the transfer of copyright is not by a
95. However, Professor Nimmer notes that "such prudence is rarely, if ever (at least
for this reason) implemented in actual practice." M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 16,
at § 10.07[A], pp. 10-54.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1982).
97. Id. § 101.

Published by Institutional Repository, 1988

23

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 3

36

ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:13

written instrument but by operation of law. Suppose Jones is
Smith's ex-wife, and she can point to a court order of equitable
distribution of the marital property granting Jones exclusive ownership of the copyright in "Green Eyes."
This problem could be handled in two ways. First, a transfer
by operation of law could be treated as simply one species of a
"conflicting transfer" within section 205(e); accordingly, subject to
the qualifications previously discussed, the first transferee who
makes an effective recordation will prevail. The only distinctive
question in this area is when the transfer by operation of law will
be deemed to have occurred. In our example, it might be said to be
the date of the court decree of distribution. The problem with this
analysis is the language of section 205(e): it speaks of transfers being "executed." This certainly is an odd word to use for transfers
by operation of law. Indeed, section 204 exempts from its general
requirements of a written instrument transfers "by operation of
law."
The second approach is to follow the literal language of the
statute. The result of this literal approach is to leave an alarming
gap in protection for bona fide purchasers for value. If section
205(e) is not read to include transfers by operation of law, the
Copyright Act lacks any provision which governs the relative priorities between a transferee who takes by an assignment and one
who takes by court order. To the extent that such transfers are not
covered, the rights of a bona fide purchaser are reduced and the
market for copyright property inhibited: The possible existence of
owners of the copyright property whose rights are not cut off by
the recordation system diminishes the value that will be paid for
copyright property.
Even these questions, however, are relatively minor when compared to another lapse in statutory protection of the bona fide purchaser. While the statute makes elaborate provisions for bona fide
purchasers with respect to recordation, it completely fails to address bona fide purchasers with respect to registration. Presumably, one purpose of both the registration and recordation provisions is to create one scheme of protection for bona fide
purchasers. As with real estate recording systems, the scheme
should insure that purchasers obtain good title to the property
they purchase. But the Copyright Act, as presently constructed,
fails to provide protection for bona fide purchasers when the original registration poses the problem.
To illustrate this problem, here is a variation of the preceding
hypothetical. Suppose Jones claims "Green Eyes" not by transfer
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from Smith but rather alleges that he is the true author of the
work."8 He tells you that he hired Smith to create the work, that
"Green Eyes" is therefore a work for hire, and that he is, in the
eyes of the law, the "author." Smith's registration, he claims, was
just one step in the misappropriation of Jones's property. Jones
tells you that, as author, he prohibits you from performing the
work in your projected show. Let us assume that everything Jones
says is true.
At first glance, the tables are now turned. Recordation is effective only if there is a predicate registration by express command of
section 205(c)(2). 9 But the statute has no express provisions about
the effect on bona fide purchasers of defective or wrongful registrations. Put simply, the statute does not indicate what happens when
the true owner fails to register the work and a bona fide purchaser
takes copyright property from one who registered the copyright
but was not the owner at the time of registration. In our example,
while Jones's failure to record would have been fatal had he taken
the copyright property by transfer, his failure to register poses no
problem when he is the author.
The significance of this is, of course, enormous: the foundation
point for the entire recording system is the registration, and it is at
this critical point where bona fide purchasers have no protection.
The fundamental question is whether such an anomaly is an unintentional loophole in the statute or whether Congress truly intended to treat the two analogous situations so differently, undermining much of the efficacy and usefulness of the recording
system."I
98. If he claims as joint author, he is entitled to exploit the copyright separately and
without the consent of the other joint author(s). His only obligation is to account to the
others for profits. See generally Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky, 535 F. Supp. 90
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc. v. Miller Music, Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205
(1947), at[f'd, 82 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 458 (1949); Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984).
99. Further, no recordation is effective unless a "reasonable search" will find the recordation "under the title or registration number." 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1) (1982). The use of the
disjunctive is strange: it would seem more sensible to limit effective recordations to those
that would appear to a "reasonable search" under the title and the registration number.
Since there must be a registration for the notice to be effective in any event, this certainly
would impose few problems, and it would narrow questions arising from minor variations in
title.
See also Northern Songs, Ltd. v. Distinguished Productions, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 638
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) and Swarovski America Ltd. v. Silver Deer, Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 1201 (D.
Colo. 1982) in which the courts concluded that these requirement- were essential only to
establish constructive notice and not essential as jurisdictional prerequisites under § 205(d).
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
100. Professor Nimmer also points out the ambiguity of the statutory text in this area
and concludes that if recordation is made prior to registration, but registration occurs subse-
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Let us return to Jones. As the employer of a work for hire by
Smith, Jones has a right to register as author and initial owner.
Smith's registration, while it appears to be legitimate, is invalid:
only an author or one who takes by transfer instrument or operation of law is permitted to register. While you are the bona fide
purchaser from Smith, all you take are the rights Smith has in the
copyright property. Since Smith has no rights in the property, he
can transfer nothing to you. This is coherent conceptually, but
such an approach obviously undermines a system of bona fide purchaser protection. Failing to provide bona fide purchaser protection against true owners who fail to register constructs the marketability of all copyrights: purchasers will always pay less because
they are buying something whose value is uncertain.
Why would the Congress adopt a system which gives so little
protection to bona fide purchaser of copyrights? There seem to be
two possible answers. The first is the "slip of the pen" theory Congress did not really appreciate that, by failing to link bona fide
purchaser rights to registration, it was building the entire edifice of
bona fide purchaser protection on sand. Alternatively, Congress
may have had some reason to limit the system of bona fide purchaser protection, even while recognizing the harm done to the
marketability of copyrights.1"' An exploration of this problem suggests a few possibilities.
Under the common law, a "thief' could not pass good title to
property. The true owner would prevail even against a bona fide
purchaser. It is true that substantial exceptions to that rule have
developed, but basically they have been in terms of what constitutes a "thief." A person who obtains property by fraud, for example, has the power to transfer good title to that property to a bona
fide purchaser. The tortfeasor's title is "voidable" in the sense that
the victim can recover the property if there is no intervening bona
fide purchaser. Similarly, a bailee may pass good title to a good
faith buyer, even though, vis-a-vis the true owner, the bailee has
02
no title at all.1
quently, constructive notice is not achieved until such registration occurs. M.
NIMMER,

NIMMER

& D.

supra note 16, at § 10.07[E].

101.

See generally Latman, The Recordationof Copyright Assignments and Licenses,
(1963).
102. The Uniform Commercial Code addresses important aspects of this problem. In
the bailment situation, the Code specifically provides that: "Any entrusting of possession of
goods to a merchant who deals with goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights
of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1977).
The Code describes when a seller can transfer better title than she herself has:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferror had or had power to

1
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At the risk of oversimplification, the rules developed in bona
fide purchaser law generally seem to be ones of comparative fault.
If the true owner has given his property to another voluntarily, the
owner's rights are subordinated to those of a bona fide purchaser.
This is true even if the owner has been betrayed. For example, if a
watch is entrusted to a jeweler to be repaired, the jeweler can pass
good title to a bona fide purchaser.10 3 Similarly, if an owner sells
goods to a buyer in return for a bad check, the buyer can pass good
title to a subsequent good faith purchaser. Even if the owner is
defrauded as to the identity of the buyer or the substance of the
transaction, the person who takes the property can pass good title
to a bona fide purchaser.
In all these cases, there are two innocent victims of a wrongdoer: the true owner and the bona fide purchaser. The loss usually
lies with the true owner because he has done something which,
however innocent or reasonable, nevertheless permitted the taker
to deal with a bona fide purchaser as if the taker were the true
owner. The action of the owner causing the problem justifies giving
the bona fide purchaser good title. The true owner can attempt to
sue only the person whom he erroneously trusted. The only time a
bona fide purchaser does not take good title is when the person
from whom he buys has void title, not merely voidable title. The
only time this occurs is when the property is obtained by a "thief"
in the most restrictive sense of the word: when the owner has done
nothing which can give the thief any claim to the property. '
Applying this analysis to the copyright scheme, however, is
problematic. If a manuscript were to be stolen by a thief and then
transfer .... A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a
good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase, the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferror was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which was later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale," or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under
the criminal law.
U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1977).
103. Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953).
104.
The general rule of law, sanctioned by common sense, is that no man can by his
sale transfer to another the right of ownership in a thing wherein he himself had
not the right of property .... No one can sell a right when he himself has none
to sell. This is a proposition so self-evident that argument cannot elucidate or
strengthen it.
Fawcett v. Osborn, 32 Ill. 411 (1863). See also Tarver v. Tarver, 242 So.2d 374 (La. Ct. App.
1970); Slaton v. Lamb, 71 So.2d 289 (Ala. 1954).
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registered, the thief would have no title. No transfers by him to
bona fide purchasers would effectively deny the true owner his
rights. The true owner could register in his own name and sue any
infringers, including bona fide purchasers from the thief. The registration obtained by the thief would be prima facie evidence of
validity of the thief's copyright, but presumably the true owner
would be able to put in proof sufficient to overcome that prima
facie effect.
Suppose in our example that Jones claims that he actually authored the work in question and in fact registered his claim of
copyright, but that he registered it under the title "Blue Eyes."
Smith is a total stranger who apparently knew a good thing when
he saw it, obtained a copy of "Blue Eyes," changed the name to
"Green Eyes," and registered the work under that title in his own
name. Because the Copyright Office cannot search for content (as
opposed to title, registration number, and recordation of transfers),
the second registration was granted to Smith.
In this situation, Jones's rights should be superior to the rights
of a bona fide purchaser from Smith. Smith is simply a thief. It
would make sense to say that the buyer took only what Smith had,
and that Smith had no title at all. Although the registration in his
name gave him an apparent copyright in the work, in reality he
had no copyright because he was neither the author nor a transferee from the author. Further, the true owner of the copyright is
not at fault: he did as much as he could to prevent such a fraud by
registering the copyright. Since the true owner and the bona fide
purchaser are in pari delicto (neither having any fault), the true
owner ought to prevail.
But suppose that the registration is not by a "thief" in the
strictest sense of the word, but rather by one who has breached the
trust placed in him by the true owner. Reverting to our hypothetical, suppose "Green Eyes" was a work for hire composed by Smith
for Jones. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, Jones is the "author"
of the work, and therefore the one entitled to register it. Smith's
registration is invalid. Should not Smith, by analogy both to personal property law and to the scheme created by the Copyright Act
itself for bona fide purchasers of transfers of interests, be able to
pass good title to the copyright property to a good faith buyer? As
between Jones and a bona fide purchaser, it is Jones's "fault" that
Smith was able to appear to sell the copyright.
In such cases, it seems that there is no policy reason not to
permit Smith to be able to transfer title to the good faith buyer,
leaving Jones to a suit against his employee Smith for breach of
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trust. This would seem to accord with the recordation provisions
which clearly protect bona fide purchasers because the true owner
(the prior transferee) failed to record his interest and therefore allowed the record owner to defraud the subsequent purchaser.
The lapse in statutory protection for bona fide purchasers
from risks emerging in registration may be the product of the view
that copyright property is so evanescent that protection is not possible. Congress, having recognized what it believed to be an insoluble problem of protecting bona fide purchasers when the same
property can be registered under different titles, made a mistake.
Congress did not pay enough attention to a problem which can be
solved: the protection of a good faith buyer when the invalid registration is in some sense the fault of the true owner.
There are two implications from this analysis. The first is a
recommendation to the judiciary: while bona fide purchasers cannot be fully protected so long as the copyright registration system
fails to provide adequate assurance that the registered work was
not previously registered, nevertheless the courts ought to be alert
to the interests of bona fide purchasers. In any situation in which
there is a conflict between claimants to the copyright, the courts
ought to consider whether a prior claimant's conduct in any way
contributed to the plight of the bona fide purchaser. If so, this
"fault" by the true owner should be a factor cutting strongly in
favor of permitting the bona fide purchaser to prevail.
This recommendation is both radical and conservative. It is
radical because it finds no support in the language of the Copyright Act of 1976. It can lead to results which appear to conflict
with the statutory prescriptions. Such a conflict will arise any time
an "author's" rights are subordinated to those of a bona fide purchaser. The statute as it exists always prefers the interest of the
true owner over those of the bona fide purchaser for value. But this
recommendation also can be viewed as profoundly conservative. It
merely suggests the incorporation into the Copyright Act of property principles that are pervasive throughout the United States; indeed, it merely takes principles which that Act already develops in
the context of recordation and applies them more broadly to the
context of registration.
The second implication of this analysis is at once more
profound and proffered more tentatively. At the time of the Copyright Act of 1976, it may have been technologically impossible to
devise a system of registration which could ensure that someone
searching for a work by content (as opposed to title or registration
number) could be sure that the work had not been previously reg-

Published by Institutional Repository, 1988

29

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 3

42

ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:13

istered under another name. In 1987, although only a decade later,
the computer revolution has proceeded far enough to mandate a
reconsideration of that assumption. At the very least, Congress
should commission a study to ascertain the technological and economic feasibility of a registration system for copyrights which
would approximate that existing for real property: a system which
would ensure, to a high degree of certainty, that a person buying a
copyright or one of the rights comprising the copyright was truly
getting what he paid for.
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